Blogger Template by Blogcrowds.



Embassy dispatches show America used spying, threats and promises of aid to get support for Copenhagen accord

WikiLeaks cables: Cancún climate talks doomed to fail, says EU president
Cancún climate change summit: Week one in pictures

A Greenpeace activist in a hot air ballon ahead of the UN climate summit in Cancún
A Greenpeace activist in a hot air ballon ahead of the current UN climate summit in Cancún. WikiLeaks cables expose US use of espionage before the 2009 Copenhagen summit. Photograph: Luis Perez/AFP/Getty Images
Hidden behind the save-the-world rhetoric of the global climate changenegotiations lies the mucky realpolitik: money and threats buy political support; spying and cyberwarfare are used to seek out leverage.
The US diplomatic cables reveal how the US seeks dirt on nations opposed to its approach to tackling global warming; how financial and other aid is used by countries to gain political backing; how distrust, broken promises and creative accounting dog negotiations; and how the US mounted a secret global diplomatic offensive to overwhelm opposition to the controversial "Copenhagen accord", the unofficial document that emerged from the ruins of the Copenhagen climate change summit in 2009.
Negotiating a climate treaty is a high-stakes game, not just because of the danger warming poses to civilisation but also because re-engineering the global economy to a low-carbon model will see the flow of billions of dollars redirected.
Seeking negotiating chips, the US state department sent a secret cable on 31 July 2009 seeking human intelligence from UN diplomats across a range of issues, including climate change. The request originated with the CIA. As well as countries' negotiating positions for Copenhagen,diplomats were asked to provide evidence of UN environmental "treaty circumvention" and deals between nations.
But intelligence gathering was not just one way. On 19 June 2009, the state department sent a cable detailing a "spear phishing" attack on the office of the US climate change envoy, Todd Stern, while talks with China on emissions took place in Beijing. Five people received emails, personalised to look as though they came from the National Journal. An attached file contained malicious code that would give complete control of the recipient's computer to a hacker. While the attack was unsuccessful, the department's cyber threat analysis division noted: "It is probable intrusion attempts such as this will persist."
The Beijing talks failed to lead to a global deal at Copenhagen. But the US, the world's biggest historical polluter and long isolated as a climate pariah, had something to cling to. The Copenhagen accord, hammered out in the dying hours but not adopted into the UN process, offered to solve many of the US's problems.
The accord turns the UN's top-down, unanimous approach upside down, with each nation choosing palatable targets for greenhouse gas cuts. It presents a far easier way to bind in China and other rapidly growing countries than the UN process. But the accord cannot guarantee the global greenhouse gas cuts needed to avoid dangerous warming. Furthermore, it threatens to circumvent the UN's negotiations on extending the Kyoto protocol, in which rich nations have binding obligations. Those objections have led many countries – particularly the poorest and most vulnerable – to vehemently oppose the accord.
Getting as many countries as possible to associate themselves with the accord strongly served US interests, by boosting the likelihood it would be officially adopted. A diplomatic offensive was launched. Diplomatic cables flew thick and fast between the end of Copenhagen in December 2009 and late February 2010, when the leaked cables end.
Some countries needed little persuading. The accord promised $30bn (£19bn) in aid for the poorest nations hit by global warming they had not caused. Within two weeks of Copenhagen, the Maldives foreign minister, Ahmed Shaheed, wrote to the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, expressing eagerness to back it.
By 23 February 2010, the Maldives' ambassador-designate to the US, Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed, told the US deputy climate change envoy, Jonathan Pershing, his country wanted "tangible assistance", sayingother nations would then realise "the advantages to be gained by compliance" with the accord.
A diplomatic dance ensued. "Ghafoor referred to several projects costing approximately $50m (£30m). Pershing encouraged him to provide concrete examples and costs in order to increase the likelihood of bilateral assistance."
The Maldives were unusual among developing countries in embracing the accord so wholeheartedly, but other small island nations were secretly seen as vulnerable to financial pressure. Any linking of the billions of dollars of aid to political support is extremely controversial – nations most threatened by climate change see the aid as a right, not a reward, and such a link as heretical. But on 11 February, Pershing met the EU climate action commissioner, Connie Hedegaard, in Brussels, where she told him, according to a cable, "the Aosis [Alliance of Small Island States] countries 'could be our best allies' given their need for financing".
The pair were concerned at how the $30bn was to be raised and Hedegaard raised another toxic subject – whether the US aid would be all cash. She asked if the US would need to do any "creative accounting", noting some countries such as Japan and the UK wanted loan guarantees, not grants alone, included, a tactic she opposed. Pershing said "donors have to balance the political need to provide real financing with the practical constraints of tight budgets", reported the cable.
Along with finance, another treacherous issue in the global climate negotiations, currently continuing in Cancún, Mexico, is trust that countries will keep their word. Hedegaard asks why the US did not agree with China and India on what she saw as acceptable measures to police future emissions cuts. "The question is whether they will honour that language," the cable quotes Pershing as saying.
Trust is in short supply on both sides of the developed-developing nation divide. On 2 February 2009, a cable from Addis Ababa reports a meeting between the US undersecretary of state Maria Otero and the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, who leads the African Union's climate change negotiations.
The confidential cable records a blunt US threat to Zenawi: sign the accord or discussion ends now. Zenawi responds that Ethiopia will support the accord, but has a concern of his own: that a personal assurance from Barack Obama on delivering the promised aid finance is not being honoured.
US determination to seek allies against its most powerful adversaries – the rising economic giants of Brazil, South Africa, India, China (Basic) – is set out in another cable from Brussels on 17 February reporting a meeting between the deputy national security adviser, Michael Froman, Hedegaard and other EU officials.
Froman said the EU needed to learn from Basic's skill at impeding US and EU initiatives and playing them off against each in order "to better handle third country obstructionism and avoid future train wrecks on climate".
Hedegaard is keen to reassure Froman of EU support, revealing a difference between public and private statements. "She hoped the US noted the EU was muting its criticism of the US, to be constructive," the cable said. Hedegaard and Froman discuss the need to "neutralise, co-opt or marginalise unhelpful countries including Venezuela and Bolivia", before Hedegaard again links financial aid to support for the accord, noting "the irony that the EU is a big donor to these countries". Later, in April, the US cut aid to Bolivia and Ecuador, citing opposition to the accord.
Any irony is clearly lost on the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, according to a 9 February cable from La Paz. The Danish ambassador to Bolivia, Morten Elkjaer, tells a US diplomat that, at the Copenhagen summit, "Danish prime minister Rasmussen spent an unpleasant 30 minutes with Morales, during which Morales thanked him for [$30m a year in] bilateral aid, but refused to engage on climate change issues."
After the Copenhagen summit, further linking of finance and aid with political support appears. Dutch officials, initially rejecting US overtures to back the accord, make a startling statement on 25 January. According to a cable, the Dutch climate negotiator Sanne Kaasjager "has drafted messages for embassies in capitals receiving Dutch development assistance to solicit support [for the accord]. This is an unprecedented move for the Dutch government, which traditionally recoils at any suggestion to use aid money as political leverage." Later, however, Kaasjager rows back a little, saying: "The Netherlands would find it difficult to make association with the accord a condition to receive climate financing."
Perhaps the most audacious appeal for funds revealed in the cables is from Saudi Arabia, the world's second biggest oil producer and one of the 25 richest countries in the world. A secret cable sent on 12 February records a meeting between US embassy officials and lead climate change negotiator Mohammad al-Sabban. "The kingdom will need time to diversify its economy away from petroleum, [Sabban] said, noting a US commitment to help Saudi Arabia with its economic diversification efforts would 'take the pressure off climate change negotiations'."
The Saudis did not like the accord, but were worried they had missed a trick. The assistant petroleum minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman told US officials that he had told his minister Ali al-Naimi that Saudi Arabia had "missed a real opportunity to submit 'something clever', like India or China, that was not legally binding but indicated some goodwill towards the process without compromising key economic interests".
The cables obtained by WikiLeaks finish at the end of February 2010. Today, 116 countries have associated themselves with the accord. Another 26 say they intend to associate. That total, of 140, is at the upper end of a 100-150 country target revealed by Pershing in his meeting with Hedegaard on 11 February.
The 140 nations represent almost 75% of the 193 countries that are parties to the UN climate change convention and, accord supporters like to point out, are responsible for well over 80% of current global greenhouse gas emissions.
At the mid-point of the major UN climate change negotiations in Cancún, Mexico, there have already been flare-ups over how funding for climate adaptation is delivered. The biggest shock has been Japan's announcement that it will not support an extension of the existing Kyoto climate treaty. That gives a huge boost to the accord. US diplomatic wheeling and dealing may, it seems, be bearing fruit.


The United States and Romania jointly selected the Deveselu Air Base near Caracal, Romania, to host a U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System which employs the SM-3 interceptor (also referred to as the “Aegis Ashore System”). The deployment to Romania is anticipated to occur in the 2015 timeframe as part of the second phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) – the U.S. national contribution to a NATO missile defense architecture.
The EPAA will provide protection of NATO European territories and populations, and augment protection of the United States, against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles from the Middle East. At the November 2010 NATO Summit, the Alliance welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to the NATO missile defense capability.
Technical Aspects of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania

  • The site will consist of a radar deckhouse and associated Aegis command, control, and communications suite. Separately, it will house a number of launch modules containing SM-3 interceptors.
     
  • Personnel can live and work safely near the Aegis radar system. The United States has safely operated the Aegis Radar Test site in Moorestown, New Jersey for over 30 years without any danger to people or the environment.
     
  • SM-3 interceptors are for defensive purposes only and have no offensive capability. They carry no explosive warheads of any type, and rely on their kinetic energy to collide with and destroy incoming enemy ballistic missile warheads.
     
  • The Aegis Ashore configuration of the ballistic missile defense system will be thoroughly tested at a specialized test center at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Hawaii starting in 2014.
Proposed Characteristics of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania
  • The U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense site is approximately 430 acres (175 hectares) and is located within the existing Romanian Air Base at Deveselu.
     
  • An estimated 200 military, government civilians, and support contractors will be required to operate the U.S. facility at the site.
Potential Debris from Intercept
  • SM-3 Interceptors based in Romania will not be used for flight tests, and will be launched only in defense against an actual attack.
     
  • The risk of damage or injury from an intercept and debris are small and pose little threat to people and property. The alternative (allowing a threat warhead to impact its target) likely would result in far more severe consequences.
Proven Defensive Capabilities
  • The Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system incorporates decades of reliable and effective operations of the Aegis ship-based system into its design and test program.
     
  • The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System has been proven effective through repeated testing. Since 2002, the system has been successful in 21 of 25 flight tests with the SM-3 interceptor.


Ireland caved in to Vatican pressure to grant immunity to church officials in the investigation of decades of sex abuse by its clergy, newly released WikiLeaks documents have shown.Bold move: Pop Benedict invited disaffected Anglicans to join the Catholic faith
Requests made by the Irish government for information 'offended many in the Vatican' who believed they had 'failed to respect and protect Vatican sovereignty during the investigation'.
But even without assistance from Rome the Irish were able to substantiate claims of abuse between 1975 and 2004.
The Vatican also complained that 'some Irish politicians were making political hay with the situation by calling publicly on the government to demand that the Vatican reply.'
Secretary of state Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone wrote to them insisting that requests must come down diplomatic channels.
The Irish exerted pressure behind the scenes to get senior officials to testify and senior church officials were sent to Rome to meet the Pontiff.
However, Irish diplomat Helena Keleher said it was understood 'foreign ambassadors are not required or expected to appear before national commissions'.
The Pope eventually released a statement saying he shared the 'outrage, betrayal and shame' of Irish Catholics.
The Irish government wanted to be seen as cooperating with the investigation because its own education department was implicated in decades of abuse, but politicians were reluctant to insist Vatican officials answer the investigators' questions, the cables indicate.
One cable discloses the behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuvers during which Irish politicians tried to persuade the Vatican to cooperate with the probe.
Pope: Leads Sunday morning Mass and the beatification of Cardinal John Newman at Cofton park, Longbridge, during his visit to Britain
Pope: Leads Sunday morning Mass and the beatification of Cardinal John Newman at Cofton park, Longbridge, during his visit to Britain
Today a Vatican statement said the WikiLeaks cables should be evaluated with 'reservations' and 'prudence', and not be taken as an 'expression' of the Holy See.
The latest WikiLeaks disclosures also revealed that Britain's ambassador in the Vatican warned that the Pope could provoke anti-Catholic violence in the UK by offering to convert Anglicans who disagreed with women priests.
Francis Campbell was speaking to an American diplomat after Pope Benedict invited disaffected Anglicans to join the Catholic faith in a meeting with Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams.


Mr Campbell, a Catholic himself, said the Pope’s scheme had left Britain’s relations with the Vatican ‘facing their worst crisis in 150 years’ and had put Dr Williams ‘in an impossible situation’. 
Ambassador Noel Fahey apparently told U.S. diplomat Julieta Valls Noyes that the sex abuse scandal was a tricky one to manage.
Mr Campbell's comments regarding women priests were also made to Mr Noyes. 
The Pope had announced a special dispensation for Anglicans to convert in groups while retaining their own leadership and some of their rites in a body called an Ordinariate. It had been arranged in Rome behind the backs of the English Catholic bishops and Dr Williams was given little warning. 
An official Vatican statement described the November 2009 meeting between Dr Williams and the pontiff as cordial, but Mr Campbell said that it was ‘at times awkward’.
At a subsequent dinner held in Dr Williams’s honour and attended by senior Vatican officials, Mr Campbell told Mr Noyes ‘Anglican-Vatican relations were facing their worst crisis in 150 years as a result of the Pope’s decision’, a cable sent to Washington shortly afterwards revealed.
The time period was a reference to the religious unrest caused in 1850 when Pope Pius IX reinstated the Roman Catholic church structure in a bid to re-establish the faith after 300 years of being downtrodden following Henry VIII’s break from Rome.
Mr Campbell said: ‘The crisis is worrisome for England’s small, mostly Irish-origin, Catholic minority. There is still latent anti-Catholicism in some parts of England and it may not take much to set it off.’
He warned: ‘The outcome could be discrimination or in isolated cases, even violence, against this minority.’ 

The ambassador added that some Vatican officials believed the Pope had been wrong not to consult the archbishop before making the announcement.
The cable continued: ‘The Vatican decision seems to have been aimed primarily at Anglicans in the U.S. and Australia, with little thought given to how it would affect the
centre of Anglicanism, England, or the Archbishop of Canterbury.’
Reporting back to Washington, the U.S. diplomat wondered ‘whether the damage to inter-Christian relations was worth it – especially since the number of disaffected Anglicans that will convert is likely to be a trickle rather than a wave’. 
Just three of the Church of England’s 114 bishops have since announced they will join the new Ordinariate. It is expected they will be joined by 50 of the church’s 10,000 priests with elements of their congregations.
In a separate conversation, Mr Campbell warned Mr Diaz that if many Anglicans decided to convert, the Catholic church in Britain could find itself financially stretched.
Other cables reveal the Pope wanted Muslim Turkey kept out of the EU and lobbied to keep the idea of ‘Christian roots’ enshrined in its constitution. The WikiLeaks releases also revealed that the Pope had a hand in gaining the release of 15
British sailors held by Iran.
The Royal Navy personnel were held for a fortnight in 2007 after they were captured by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards while searching a merchant vessel off the Iran-Iraq border.
They were released to mark Easter 13 days later. 
A confidential briefing prepared for President Obama ahead of a visit to Rome in 2009 reveals the Pope contacted religious fundamentalists in Tehran.
The documents states: ‘The Vatican helped secure the release of British sailors detained in Iranian waters in April 2007.’
The Vatican press office declined to comment on the content of the cables regarding the Vatican's influence over Ireland but decried the leaks as a matter of 'extreme gravity'.
The U.S. ambassador to the Holy See also condemned the leaks and said the Vatican and America cooperate in promoting universal values.




WikiLeaks: Germany Protests U.S. Military Docking Milllions from Afghan Army Fund

The US military has been charging its allies a 15% handling fee on hundreds of millions of dollars being raised internationally to build up the Afghan army. Germany has threatened to cancel contributions.
According to a protest to the US from Germany’s ambassador to Nato this year, Berlin raised questions about the fate of €50m (£42m) it dispensed last year as the biggest contribution to a “trust fund” for the Afghan national army.
In protests in Berlin, Brussels, and Washington last February the German government demanded to know what was happening to the money, why earmarked projects were not going ahead and why the US military was taking 15%.
A cable to Washington from the US mission to Nato sought instructions on how to respond to the protests from Ulrich Brandenburg, the German ambassador to the military alliance.
Read related article “Germany accuses US over ‘missing’ Afghan funds, WikiLeaks cables show” in the Guardian here.


Source: WikiLeaks
The German ambassador to Nato hands a letter to his US counterpart challenging Pentagon on allied donations to an Afghan army trust fund, warning that Berlin will stop paying if US continues to take a 15% handling fee.
Wednesday, 03 February 2010, 15:56
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000052
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS MOPS, MASS, MCAP, PREL, PGOV, NATO, AF, GM
SUBJECT: RFG: GERMAN DEMARCHE ON DISBURSEMENT OF
CONTRIBUTION TO ANA TRUST FUND
Classified By: A/PolAd A. “Hoot” Baez. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) This is a request for guidance. Please see para 8.
2. (C) SUMMARY: On February 3, German PermRep Brandenburg demarched Ambassador Daalder regarding concerns Berlin has over the disbursement of 50 million Euros it donated in October 2009 to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. He said that money for earmarked projects had not been disbursed, resulting in delayed projects. He also said that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was charging a 15 percent administrative fee. He said that German parliamentarians were beginning to ask questions about how this money has been handled, adding that this could make it difficult for Berlin to provide additional contributions in the future. Ambassador Daalder said that he believed there were some factual inaccuracies in the German demarche, but promised to forward it to Washington for a formal response. We request Washington guidance NLT Monday, February 8, on how to respond to Brandenburg. We ask that in drafting this guidance Washington take into consideration appropriate political factors, as well as technical budget and project management ones. END SUMMARY
Germany: Why Has Our Money Not Been Used on Our Projects?
——————————————— ————
2. (C/REL GERMANY) On February 3, German PermRep Brandenburg demarched Ambassador Daalder regarding 50 million euros that Berlin had donated to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund in October 2009, handing over a non-paper reported in para 10 below. According to Brandenburg, this money had been earmarked for use in several specific projects — the ANS Logistics School in Kabul, an engineering school in Mazar-e-Sharif, and an ANA Barracks in Feyzabad — but so far no money had been disbursed for these projects. He argued, for example that construction of the logistics school had come to a halt.
And Why Are You Charging Us an Administrative Fee?
——————————————— —–
3. (C/REL GERMANY) Brandenburg said that he had been instructed to raise this with us because of the unique role of the U.S., particularly the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in this process. He said that there was a particular concern in Berlin about a 15 percent administrative fee allegedly being charged by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. At the same time, he acknowledged that Berlin also had issues with how SHAPE and the NATO Office of Resources was handling the issue, adding that Germany would also be raising this issue with NATO officials.
Creates Problems for Future Donations to the ANA Trust Fund
——————————————— ————–
4. (C/REL GERMANY) Brandenburg said that this was more than a technical budget and project management issue He said that several German parliamentarians were asking questions about these funds. He said that the German Government was in the process of preparing its 2010 budget and would like to be able to make an additional contribution to the ANA Trust Fund, but that parliamentary questions and concerns about how the initial 50 million euro contribution was being handled could make this increasingly difficult. He added that — since this was becoming “the talk of the town” in Kabul — it might also create difficulties in our ability to get other countries to contribute to the ANA Trust Fund.
5. (C/REL Germany) Brandenburg said that this demarche would be delivered in Washington, as well as other places. (Note: We understand it was also delivered to the Embassy Berlin.)
German FM to Raise with SecGen
——————————
6. (C/REL GERMANY) Brandenburg said that since this money came from the MFA, German FM Westerwelle had taken an interest in the issue and would likely raise this with NATO
USNATO 00000052 002 OF 003
Secretary General Rasmussen when he sees him at the Munich Security Conference.
Daalder: Inaccuracies, but Will Seek Washington Guidance
——————————————— ———–
7. (C/REL GERMANY) The Ambassador said that there appeared to be some factual inaccuracies in the German demarche, but promised to forward it to Washington with a request for a formal response.
REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
——————–
8. (C) RFG: We request Washington guidance NLT Monday, February 8, on how to respond to the German demarche.
9. (C/NF) COMMENT: As the Ambassador said to Brandenburg, there do seem to be some inaccuracies in the German demarche. At the same time, it is important we also recognize the serious political concerns the demarche raises. For example, while there may be good reasons for the 15 percent fee — we understand it is a contingency fee not an administrative one — the appearance that the U.S. is charging Allies an excessive fee for the use of monies they have donated to the ANA Trust Fund may be difficult to explain away during a parliamentary debate. Brandenburg is probably correct in arguing that issues such as this could make it more difficult to encourage nations to donate to the Trust Fund. Indeed, it took us months to even work out the agreements we needed to get the original German donation to the Trust Fund. We therefore urge Washington to look into this issue from a political, as well as technical/financial, dimension and with as much transparency as possible. END COMMENT
The Demarche Text
—————–
10. (C/REL Germany) The text of the German non-paper is reproduced in full below:
BEGIN TEXT
3 February 2010
– Refer to GER Agreement dated October 1st with NATO acting through its Office of Resources by which GER has committed to a voluntary contribution of Euros 50 mio to the ANA Trust Fund. Funds had been transferred to a SHAPE account in late October 2009.
– Note the agreement that the GER contribution should be used exclusively for the aims set out in the ANA TF Project Document dated September 15th 2009, among them three prioritised projects mentioned in Annex 10 of the Project Document (1. ANS Logistic School Kabul, to the amount of Euro 2 mio in 2009; 2. Engineering School in Mazar-e-Sharif, to the amount of Euros 4 mio in 2009, 3. ANA Barracks in Feyzabad, to the amount of Euro 1 mio. in 2009). As of today, no project financing has occurred.
– Note that, at variance with the GER/IS agreement and the overarching MoU between the US, NATO and SHAPE on the “Management and Administration of Trust Fund Donations for support and sustainment of the ANA”, transfer of the German ANA TF contribution to an US treasury account (resulting in the prevalence of US procurement procedures, including assignment of the US Army Corps of Engineers and an administrative fee of 15 percent) would be made without due consideration of the German donation caveat, thereby hindering the early funding of the prioritised projects and thus the application of the German/IS Agreement.
– Note that the issue has been raised already in the German Parliament leading to questions why the Federal Government had donated money without any tangible effect on the prioritised projects yet. Likewise, charging a 15 percent fee for managing and executing ANA TF, especially when
USNATO 00000052 003 OF 003
applied to the funding of projects pursued by Germany, will inevitably attract heavy criticism by German audit bodies and parliamentary commissions.
– Request partners, given construction delays that have already occurred and the urgency of respective funding requirements, to revert to the letter and spirit of the GER/IS Agreement and make sure that funds earmarked for the prioritised projects totalling Euro 7 mio will be transferred without any further delay. As laid down in the GER/IS agreement the earmarked funds (with regard to the prioritised projects to the amount of Euro 7 mio, in particular with regard to the ANA Logistic School, Kabul, to the amount of Euro 2 mio., as the financially most pressing case, since construction is already under way) need to be re-allocated at the Kabul level to the GER Einsatzverwaltungsstelle ISAF in order to allow for a swift implementation of the prioritised projects.
– Urge partners to expedite the execution of funds donated by GER to the ANA TF aside from the prioritised projects and submit proofs of employment of funds in accordance with the US/NATO/SHAPE MoU as soon as possible.
– Express concern about the fact that any further delay in allocating funds to the prioritised GER projects and executing the remainder of funds donated by GER must substantially impair prospects for any further German contributions to the ANA TF.
END TEXT
HEFFERN

Postări mai noi Postări mai vechi Pagina de pornire