Wiki Leaks

[Roland Galharague, MFA
A/S-equivalent for Continental Europe] asked that the USG work together with
the EU to discourage the Serbians from proposing a new U.N.
resolution on Kosovo, stating that Serbian Foreign Minister
Jeremic “seems to believe Serbia can win on Kosovo and win EU
entry. We need to let him know this is not true.” Right
now, Galharague reported, “the Serbs are furious with us (the
French)” in response to the demarche the GOF delivered in
Belgrade in early February (reftel) about Serbia’s possible
plans for a U.N. resolution. “We delivered the message in
very forceful terms.” In fact, the Serbs interpreted the
demarche as a major change in position, Galharague reported.

The EU had thus far maintained the position that the issues
of Kosovo and Serbian entry into the EU were not formally
linked. “There was no formal conditionality,” Galharague
said, adding that the Serbs now understand that to be a
member of the EU they must eventually recognize Kosovo. “We
told them we do not want another Cyprus,” he explained,
referring to Cyprus’ controversial EU accession in 2004 as a
divided island where EU legislation remains partly
“suspended” in the northern part of the island which is
outside of the government in Nicosia’s control. Nonetheless,
Galharague predicted the Serbs will likely go ahead with the
U.N. resolution in any case, and the USG and the EU will be
forced to oppose it.

Furthermore, Galharague asserted, before the
Serbs join the EU, they will need to resolve key issues with
Kosovo in the fields of justice, police, customs, transport,
agriculture, and also any differences over names and
terminology. The best way for Serbia to address issues
related to Kosovo is by working with the European Union Rule
of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). “At the end of the day,
though,” he reiterated, “Serbia must recognize Kosovo if it
wants to join the EU.”

During a December 12 meeting with the Ambassador,
Council of Europe (COE) Secretary General Terry Davis
complained of what he described as continued NATO
unresponsiveness to COE requests for access to KFOR-run
detention centers in Kosovo. He claimed he had sent seven
separate letters to NATO SYG de Hoop Sheffer, none of which
had elicited a satisfactory response. Davis described Kosovo
as a “black hole” for the COE Committee on the Prevention of
Torture, notwithstanding the fact that the COE charter gives
the organization the right to visit any detention place in
member states. Given NATO’s obsructionism, Davis told the
Ambassador—“as a courtesy,” he said—that he would have
no/no choice but to “go public” over the issue in early 2006.

¶3. (C) Davis concluded that others, but not he, had begun to
“connect the dots” and were speculating that Kosovo might be
a site for secret CIA prisons free from international
scrutiny. We note that on November 26, Le Monde carried an
article in which the COE’s Human Rights Commissioner, Alvaro
Gil-Robles, is reported as claiming that a September 2002
visit to Camp Bondsteel had given him the impression that it
may have served as a detainee camp. This story was rebutted
the following day in Le Figaro and Le Monde by the French
general who was in charge of KFOR at the time, who stated
that all interrogations of suspects at Bondsteel had been
conducted in the presence of NATO—that is to say, French—officers.

¶12. (C) FM Kouchner said that Bosnia remained a
problem, but, it was important to simply “follow the
road.” It was important to push the Serbian government
closer to the EU, though he conceded this was difficult
due to Dutch and Belgian objections to the failure of
the Serbs to hand over Ratko Mladic to ICTY. Presumably
referring to EULEX, he said there was success on the
ground in Kosovo as the two sides were not killing each
other and concluded that things were not in a bad place
for the moment

 In the Balkans, where its troops have served for more than 15 years, Spain has shown its ability to maintain troops for the long-term. Right now, however, we need keep making our case to keep troops in Kosovo. For domestic political reasons and fear of provoking Russia, Spain is ambivalent about the current direction of Kosovo policy. So long as there is a UN resolution authorizing the Ahtissari plan, Spain will maintain its troops in KFOR. If the UN fails to agree on a new resolution, Spain has said that it would have to seriously consider pulling its troops out, but has emphasized that it would do this only in extremis and only in careful consultation with allies. We need to keep the pressure on, reminding Spain that NATO has a critical role and that we can’t let the Russians drive a wedge between the US and Europe on issues like this.

MFA Assistant Minister Mohamad Al-Rumaihi told Ambassador December 20 that Qatar’s IMF and World Bank votes in favor of Kosovo show Qatar’s true sympathies on recognizing Kosovo. The Russian President, however, has asked Qatar to “go slow” in announcing recognition, he said. Out of sensitivity to Russian concerns, Al-Rumaihi said, Qatar has done so. He encouraged Secretary Clinton to ask HBJ about the timing of Qatar’s eventual recognition, noting that that Qatar had been approached by organizers of a UK project about using its good offices with the Government of Kosovo to protect Kosovo’s Christian heritage once Qatar formally recognizes its independence.

”[Elysee Diplomatic Advisor Jean-David] Levitte noted that the EULEX mission is having diplomatic problems with the Kosovar government and public after signing two technical protocols with Serbia. They are hoping to ensure continued calm as Kosovo heads into municipal elections. [Assistant Secretary Philip H.] Gordon stated that the Kosovars will have to accept the protocols but that it should be clearly explained that these are technical agreements that have no impact on Kosovo’s independent status. Levitte also criticized Serbian FM Jeremic, saying that he is doing nothing to encourage Serb return or participation in Kosovo’s government. Levitte noted that Jeremic “makes big promises” every time he comes to France, but doesn’t follow through. Levitte no longer meets with him and does not consider him to be the “modern face of Belgrade” that he purports to be.

[ Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun] Sinirlioglu registered the Turkey Government’s determination to resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey’s immediate diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end, Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian “genocide.” The United States and Turkey have “agreed to disagree” on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia; nevertheless, “we value your involvement in the Balkans.”

—We encourage you to recognize an independent Kosovo, as
Saudi Arabia and others have now done. We certainly
appreciate your votes in favor of Kosovo in the IMF and World
Bank. They are important precursors to formal recognition,
but when will you take that final step?

Guido Westerwelle also spoke against any type of automatic decision in favor of membership for Turkey. There was also general agreement that the EU is not ready for new members at this time beyond Croatia

Chancellery National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen revealed that Serb President Tadic was coming to Berlin the week of November 16 for consultations. He noted that while Tadic always claimed to be tough on Republika Srpska PM Dodic, he needed to be tougher. While expressing pessimism about whether it would ever be possible to turn Bosnia into a “working state,” Heusgen agreed it was important to keep trying